

The Italian Left and Gorbačëv

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In this paper I will examine the relations between the main parties of the Italian left – the Communist Party (PCI) and the Socialist Party (PSI) – and the new Soviet leadership led by Michail Sergeevich Gorbachev, since his election as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in March 1985, on the eve of his State visit to Italy at the end of 1989.

1. The rise to the top of the CPSU of a young leader open to renewal, as Gorbachev immediately revealed to be, aroused a keen interest in Italian politics, and especially in left-wing forces. Moreover, the Soviet leader himself, in addition to being part of that generation that was formed in the climate of openness and reforms favored by the advent of Khrushchev, was in some ways indebted to the critical solicitations sent by the PCI especially in the years of Berlinguer¹, and more generally of the political culture of Italian communism, i.e. of that political culture which had profoundly innovated the theoretical heritage and experiences of twentieth-century communism, constituting an essential element of what Silvio Pons and Michele Di Donato have defined as "reforming communism". The two scholars wrote:

The reform communist tradition's influence on Gorbachev and his leading group can be detected in the memoirs of protagonists such as Mlynář and Cherniaev. What is less well known is that personal encounters with Italian communist leaders were also significant for the evolution of the Soviet reformers' ideas. [...] Theirs was the only discourse Gorbachev could hear within the communist movement that sounded consistent with his own concern for change and innovation [p. 196].

The influence, however, was reciprocal, and the advent of Gorbachev meant for the Italian Communist Party the rekindling of that relationship with the Soviet Communist Party which had been languishing for some time and the flowering of new hopes on the Soviet Union's capacity for self-reform.

The first meeting between Gorbachev and the Italian communists took place on the occasion of the funeral of the PCI Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, in June 1984, which greatly impressed Gorbachev who led the CPSU delegation, as he himself recalled in his memoirs².

A second meeting, now with the new Secretary Alessandro Natta at the head of the PCI delegation, took place in March 1985 on the sidelines of another funeral (this one, however, rather modest), that of the Soviet leader Konstantin Černenko, replaced by Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU. In his book *Incontri con Gorbaciov*, Antonio Rubbi, who was head of the Foreign Section of the PCI, gives a detailed account of the meeting held in the Kremlin (with Gorbachev and the head of the International Department, the conservative Boris Ponomarëv, for the CPSU, and Natta,

¹ Cfr. Rubbi, *Incontri con Gorbaciov*, pp. 26-27; U. De Giovannangeli, "Il mio incontro con Gorbaciov: da Craxi e Andreotti all'amicizia con Berlinguer. La sua perestroika sfruttata dall'Occidente", interview with Gianni Cervetti, "Il Riformista", 1° settembre 2022.

² Gorbačëv, *Ogni cosa a suo tempo*, pp. 263-264.

Emanuele Macaluso and Rubbi himself for the PCI), after the Soviet leader had exhausted the meetings with the state delegations that had come for the funeral. «The diagnosis on the economic and social state of the country - recalls Rubbi - was pitiless. He was the first Soviet leader to speak of the condition of his country without feeling the need to prefix the list of conquests and successes", which was a significant novelty, and he underlined the need for "a clear change in the orientations of domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union". The meeting also discussed the negotiations underway in Geneva between the USA and the USSR for the reduction of atomic weapons: in the fight for disarmament - Gorbachev argued - the communist parties should have been at the forefront, working to "coordinate actions for peace on a European and global scale"»; however, this last approach was rejected by Natta, who underlined the new features and the autonomy of the peace movement. Common to the two leaders, on the other hand, was the desire to "set the relations between the two parties on a completely new basis, inaugurating "a completely new and unprecedented chapter»³. Moreover, the PCI was the only European communist party that Gorbachev wanted to meet, demonstrating a clear desire for change⁴ and identifying the Italian party as a privileged interlocutor. As Marco Di Maggio has documented, Natta concluded his notes on the Moscow talks with an explicit «I like Gorbachev». However, in his report to the Party Executive, he suggested looking at the new Soviet course without prejudices «but also without the "co-responsibility of those who feel they are inside, part"» of an international communist movement which for the PCI was a thing of the past⁵. Alongside the faith in the greater "dynamism" that Gorbachev would impress on Soviet policy, the Italian Communists therefore maintained a cautious and prudent attitude⁶.

As for the Italian Socialist Party, however, Gorbachev's rise to power was greeted with strong skepticism. Even before his election as General Secretary of the CPSU, in the socialist journal "Mondoperaio" Mauro Martini, in citing him as one of the candidates for the greatest responsibilities in the Soviet leadership, had expressed a strongly negative judgment on his generation of leaders, whom he considered «marked by transformism, careerism, personal interest»⁷. This judgment was taken up by Luciano Vasconi, who in the same journal, the day after the election of Gorbachev, albeit within the context of an articulated analysis, confirmed the skepticism about the reforming abilities of the new Secretary⁸.

In the case of the PSI, however, direct confrontation with the leader of the CPSU took place above all at an institutional level, starting with the meeting between Gorbachev and Craxi, then prime minister but also current president of the European Economic Community (EEC), held in Moscow a few months after the election of Gorbachev, in May 1985. In those talks - with the Italian delegation formed by Craxi and Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, and the Soviet one formed by Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Andrej Gromyko - the Italian premier focused on the East-West dialogue, on the «progress of the EEC» and on the prospects for collaboration between the latter, the USSR and

³ Rubbi, 50-56. Cf. the minutes in FG, APC, 1985, Segreteria, mf. 8505, pp. 150-156.

⁴ Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor*, p. 75.

⁵ Di Maggio, *Tra socialdemocrazie e perestrojka*, p. 201.

⁶ Pons, *L'invenzione del "post-comunismo"*, p. 24.

⁷ M. Martini, *URSS: i cinquantenni allo specchio*, in "Mondoperaio", 1984, n. 1.

⁸ L. Vasconi, *Aspettando Godot (e la riforma) è arrivato Gorbačëv*, ivi, 1985, n. 4.

Comecon⁹. It was a subject considered very important by Gorbachev, who had spoken about it a few days earlier during the visit to Moscow of Gianni Cervetti, group leader in the European Parliament of the Communist and Allied Group. On that occasion, the Soviet leader had mentioned the goal of a real agreement between the EEC and Comecon; as Rubbi will observe, it was «a real turning point of the Soviet Union with respect to the EEC»¹⁰. As for relations between the EEC and the USSR, Cervetti had suggested that he ask that the European Community deal with the Soviet Union "as a 'political entity'" with its own autonomous profile; a solicitation that Gorbachev accepted, using it in the official toast during the meeting with Craxi¹¹. Even to the Italian premier he confirmed his orientation in favor of organic relations between the two communities. As for the Geneva talks with the United States, the Soviet leader reiterated the need for an overall and non-sectoral negotiation, expressing deep concern about the "Strategic Defense Initiative" carried out by US President Ronald Reagan, which risked nullifying the dialogue just started. These considerations - according to the reconstruction of Gennaro Acquaviva and Antonio Badini, diplomatic adviser to the Prime Minister at the time - were implemented and essentially shared by Craxi and Andreotti himself. Craxi perceived that Gorbachev "was sincerely interested in finding an agreement on Euromissiles, so as to be able to relaunch the economic cooperation dialogue with Europe", and in the European Council meeting in Milan a month later, he mentioned to Jacques Delors the opportunity that the Commission to start informal consultations with Comecon¹². Finally, in the talks in Moscow, the Italian leader raised the question of the Sakharov spouses, obtaining from Gorbachev the commitment of his interest, which will lead some time later to the positive solution of the question¹³.

To Craxi, the leader of the CPSU appeared «as a courageous politician», who could «bring the "Soviet ship" out of the "shallows"» in which it found itself. Thus began a dialogue that developed in the following months through an exchange of letters, initiated by Gorbachev in August, with a letter in which he explained to Craxi the reasons for the Soviet decision to unilaterally suspend atomic experiments, on which the Italian premier declared his appreciation, hoping for a total ban on experiments. In November, however, it was Craxi who wrote to the leader of the CPSU, congratulating "the good results of the summit" with Reagan held a few days earlier, which had marked a step forward on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, although the distances on the SDI remained unchanged¹⁴. Gorbachev wrote to the Italian president again at the end of the year, anticipating the guidelines with which the USSR would face the continuation of the Geneva negotiations and asking for a contribution from NATO countries on the question of the moratorium on nuclear tests. However, his request remained unanswered. In June 1986, with a new letter, Gorbachev resumed dialogue with Craxi, illustrating the new package of Soviet proposals, but the Italian president was convinced that the American approach was the "most rational and convenient" one, reinforcing his understanding with Reagan after the Sigonella crisis¹⁵.

⁹ Acquaviva, Badini, *La pagina saltata della Storia*, pp. 137-140.

¹⁰ Rubbi, 69-70.

¹¹ Cervetti, *Compagno del secolo scorso*, pp. 302-304.

¹² Acquaviva, Badini, *La pagina saltata della Storia*, pp. 138-140, 144-145, 157.

¹³ Ivi, p. 152.

¹⁴ Ivi, pp. 148, 141-143. On the US-USSR summit, <https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai8634.pdf>.

¹⁵ Acquaviva, Badini, *La pagina saltata della Storia*, pp. 143-144.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership continued to focus on a strategic understanding with the PCI. At the end of 1985 the Soviets urged the resumption of contacts, which intensified in view of the Congresses of the PCI and CPSU Congresses. The visit of a delegation of the Italian party to Moscow was therefore fixed for January 1986. On the eve of the visit, with a note to the Secretary, the group leader in the Chamber of Deputies Giorgio Napolitano, leader of the reformist wing of the party, took care to delimit the boundaries of the resumption of dialogue: the PCI was a force of the "European left" and did not intend to return to "a logic of international communist movement and a privileged relationship with the CPSU". During the talks, Natta had to raise the question of human rights in the USSR which – as Di Maggio observes – «had been one of the warhorses of the PSI» and was now «a tool used by Reagan's American administration to downsize the impact of Gorbachev's initiatives»¹⁶.

Of these talks - in which the Soviet leader was no longer joined by Ponomarev but by Vadim Zagladin, deputy head of the international department of the CPSU with much more open positions, while the Italian delegation was made up of Natta, Macaluso, Gian Carlo Pajetta and Renato Sandri - there are various reports. Gorbachev presented an unscrupulous analysis of the problems of Soviet society, in which - he stated - one should have been inspired by a criterion of "truth" without hiding difficulties and limits, reaffirming his desire to give a clear change to the functioning of the economic system, with "new management criteria", promoting "a full democratization of society" and greater "popular participation in productive and social processes». Gorbachev, on the other hand, showed great interest in the transformation processes underway in the capitalist West, in the context of a world which he saw as more and more interdependent and which therefore should have been based on disarmament, peace and cooperation. These themes had been central to Enrico Berlinguer's elaboration and on these the harmony with the Italian delegation was almost complete, as well as on the relationship between democracy and socialism. The dissent instead concerned the role that a renewed international communist movement should have in this perspective, also in order to react to the powerful offensive of capitalism. For Gorbachev, the communist movement remained "a great force on a world scale", which had to return to its original inspiration without flattening itself on the positions of social democracy. According to Natta, however, the communist movement showed "an obsolescence of the same inspiring principles", for which the communist parties had to face "a profound revision". With regard to the Soviet leader's proposal according to which, even without "reviving the International", the communist parties should equip themselves with opportunities for confrontation and new forms of collaboration, the response of the Italian Secretary was negative: the differences between the various communist parties were now considerable; as for the PCI, it «is not, nor does it feel, part of an international communist movement which in the traditional sense [...] does not exist and whose re-foundation, as well as being impossible, would cause serious damage». It was a challenging position: in fact, only the possibility of bilateral meetings remained¹⁷. Although Gorbachev reiterated that the axis with the PCI was of particular importance to him, it is clear that the Italian party's refusal of joint action for the renewal of the communist movement and new forms of coordination at least partially modified the framework that he had imagined, stimulating a change in its approach, which from then on was less and less oriented towards the relaunch of the communist movement and increasingly concentrated

¹⁶ Di Maggio, *Tra socialdemocrazie e perestrojka*, pp. 204-205.

¹⁷ Rubbi, pp. 78-95. Cfr. anche Pons, p. 25; Di Maggio, pp. 206-207.

on the issues of peace and disarmament, objectives with respect to which the same attitude towards social democracies recorded a significant change¹⁸.

2. In the following months, the attention of the Italian left towards Gorbachev's policy grew further. The Soviet leader's increasingly decisive progress along the path of détente and reforms was perceived "in real time" by the Communists, who seemed to abandon their initial cautions, which favored the formation of a "privileged relationship between Gorbachev's USSR and the PCI"¹⁹. A leading executive such as Paolo Bufalini judged the turning point imprinted by Gorbachev even deeper than the one realized by Khrushchev, «perhaps just because times are now more than ripe and there is even a serious delay». For his part, Achille Occhetto, co-ordinator of the PCI Secretariat, emphasized the «Gorbachev's steadfast intention to plan the whole reform focusing the [...] relationship between democracy and socialism, with a rather radical criticism of the past»²⁰. The PCI therefore undertook to disseminate texts and documents in Italy that gave an account of the new course of Soviet policy, and also of the resistance it encountered²¹. The journal "Rinascita" published a small volume, edited by the Czechoslovak dissident Zdenek Mlynar, dedicated to the Gorbachev Project. In May 1987 the PCI newspaper "l'Unità" was the first Italian newspaper to publish an interview with the Secretary of the CPSU, which had a wide echo not only nationally but also at European level²².

A few months later, for the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, the Soviet party, in addition to the communist parties, invited to Moscow all the parties of the Socialist International (of which more than thirty accepted) and various other political and mass movements. In addition to the PCI delegation led by Secretary Natta, representatives of the Socialist Party (with Deputy Secretary Claudio Martelli) and the Social Democratic Party also left Italy. As the press headlined, the "entire world left" had arrived at the Kremlin; the PCI - Napolitano specified in an interview - participated in the celebrations "as an integral part of the European left". Gorbachev's speech - which constituted an attempt to draw up a balance sheet of 70 years of history, presenting perestroika as a "second revolution after that of October" - was judged positively not only by the representatives of the PCI, but also by Martelli and the Social Democrat Antonio Cariglia. The solemn session, however, was followed by a less formal forum, focused on the problems "of today's world", in which almost two hundred parties and movements participated, well beyond the communist movement. It was the type of international conference - an informal "working" meeting, open to progressive forces of different orientations - that the PCI had claimed since the 1960s, so that Gorbachev, in a side conversation with the Italian communist delegation, was able to joke: «We did as you wanted». In addition to Napolitano for the PCI, Laura Fincato for the Socialist Party also spoke in the forum, according to whom perestroika «favored a rapprochement of the historical positions between the communists and social democracy», and Ruggero Puletti for the Social Democratic

¹⁸ Cf. Pons, p. 26; Di Maggio, pp. 207-208.

¹⁹ Pons, pp. 26-27.

²⁰ *Quella famosa "spinta propulsiva", "l'Unità", 27 febbraio 1986; La novità che mi colpì, ibid., 28 gennaio 1987: both mentioned in A. Agosti, *Paralleli Destinies*, pp. 185, 187.*

²¹ Gorbacëv, *Proposte per una svolta. La relazione al XXVII Congresso del Pcus e altri documenti con una prefazione-intervista inedita dell'autore*, Editori Riuniti, 1986; *Se vince Gorbaciov. Storia immagini documenti riflessioni nel 70° della Rivoluzione d'ottobre*, l'Unità Editrice, 1987.

²² Rubbi, pp. 119-121.

Party, who also gave a positive assessment of the new Soviet course. «The more we go on along this road – Napolitano agreed – the more the prospect of rapprochement and collaboration between all the progressive forces will materialize»²³.

This was, in fact, the direction along which the confrontation continued in the following months and years. In Italy, Editori Riuniti, the publishing house of the PCI, published Gorbačëv's speech for the anniversary of the October Revolution, under the title *October and perestroika. The revolution continues*. In particular, the full and complete acquisition, axis of Gorbachev's "new thought", of the impossibility of considering war as a means of solving problems in the atomic age referred not only to the Khrushchevian "peaceful coexistence", but also to the elaboration that Togliatti had been working on these subjects since 1945. The same principle of interdependence, another axis of the "new way of thinking", was read by Giuseppe Vacca, director of the Gramsci Institute, as the reflection of "a conception of Marxism as [...] theory of hegemony"²⁴. A profound harmony therefore emerged, which increased the attention of the Italian communists towards the Gorbachev experiment. Vacca himself, taking up an observation by Napolitano according to which the main novelty of the project lay «in the coherence between the reformatory plan drawn up for Soviet society and the proposals concerning international relations», underlined that this was «the essential starting point for defining a relationship between Western European socialism and the strategy of the new Soviet leadership»²⁵.

In March 1988 another important meeting took place in Moscow between a delegation of the PCI led by Natta (with Napolitano, Rubbi and Sandri) and one of the CPSU led by Gorbachëv (with Aleksandr Jakovlev, Anatoly Dobrynin, Zagladin and Anatoli Cernjaev). On that occasion, the Soviet leader started from the transformations taking place in the capitalist world and from the progress of European integration. On both grounds, the left appeared to him to be late, lacking an in-depth analysis of the new phase of capitalist development and also of a political proposal capable of making a change in European integration, building "a socialist alternative"; on this, the role of the PCI could be precious, and for this reason Gorbachev looked favorably on the dialogue with the socialist and social democratic parties carried on by the Italian communists. Natta, for his part, recognized that the European lefts still lacked "unitary action strategies and programmes"; it was necessary to overcome "nationalistic closures and party sectarianism" and "open a completely new page in the history [...] of the entire European workers' and democratic movement". Gorbachev also reiterated the USSR's strong interest in "a cooperative relationship between the EEC and Comecon"²⁶.

In the second part of the talks, the Soviet leader returned to his idea of a "common European home". The USSR, he claimed, "considered itself fully, and in the first place, a European country"; despite the close dialogue with the United States, «relations with Europe [...] were a priority for them. Indeed, it was time to start thinking about inter-European relations», which would go «beyond the opposing blocks [...] beyond the "systems", to reconnect us to the roots of our common history [...] and develop them according to the needs of the contemporary age». Of course, "the differences

²³ Rubbi, pp. 135-145.

²⁴ *Gorbačëv e la sinistra europea*, pp. 20-21 and *passim*.

²⁵ Ivi, p. 16.

²⁶ Rubbi, pp. 163-170. Cf. Pons, pp. 28-29; Di Maggio, p. 225.

between the two current Europes" could not be "neither hidden nor eliminated" all at once; however, the Europeans had «a common destiny. If today there is interdependence on a planetary level, all the more it operates in Europe". In this context, Gorbachev proposed "a 'round table' between all the European political forces, from communists to liberals", on the theme of the "common home". On this last issue, the PCI had some elements of skepticism. For Natta, the realistic goal was that of "a sort of multilateral cooperation that did not disregard the political and social systems in force and did not tend towards an indistinct unity", but involved the effort to find shared solutions to common problems²⁷.

References to the international communist movement had now also disappeared from Gorbachev's approach, which in fact had accepted the PCI's orientation to pose the question of international ties in the broader context of the European left²⁸. For their part, the Italian communists now seemed to have greater faith in the Soviet leader and wanted to contribute to his work of renewal, as well as to the knowledge in Italy of the political confrontation underway in the USSR. In the Summer of 1988, the 19th CPSU Conference outlined the characters of the institutional reform, with a new People's Congress, that was to be partly elected through universal suffrage, partly composed of representatives elected by the social organizations. The Italian Communists commented on the reform in almost enthusiastic terms²⁹. For its part, "Mondoperaio" gave a more cautious, but substantially positive opinion: the nomenklatura – wrote Lucio Leante – was subjected «to a double check: from above, by an unquestionable secretary-president and, from below, by the "elected by the people"», albeit in a one-party regime. «Gorbachev, putting political and institutional reform [...] at the top of his perestroika agenda, [had] crossed the Rubicon in front of which economic reforms always lie in communist countries»³⁰.

In the same weeks, the envoy of "l'Unità" in Moscow, Giulietto Chiesa, began working together with the dissident historian Roy Medvejev on a book on perestroika, which came out in 1989 for the Garzanti publishing house³¹, while the Unità publishing house continued to document the ongoing debate in the Soviet Union and in the world about the "new thinking"³².

A few weeks later, the Conference of Socialist Leaders of the European Community was held in Rome. On that occasion, the PSI presented a "Project of an appeal by the European left to Gorbachev (to be submitted, for approval, to the various European leaders on the 20th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia)"³³. The attempt was to keep the pressure on Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership alive, also by bringing out the contradictions and limits of the new course. "Mondoperaio" too continued to be very critical of the Soviet leader, now engaged in the reform of the political system in a presidential direction. Luciano Vasconi called him an «enlightened (for now) despot»³⁴, whom the West was helping too much³⁵. In fact, on the socialist side, distrust towards

²⁷ Rubbi, pp. 180-186. Cf. Pons, p. 29. On the position of the PCI with regard to the "Common European Home", specified on the eve of the visit to the USSR, cf. Di Maggio, p. 225.

²⁸ Cf. Rubbi, p. 180; Pons, p. 29; Di Maggio, p. 226.

²⁹ Agosti, *Parallel Destinies*, pp. 190-191.

³⁰ *La repubblica presidenziale di Gorbačëv*, in "Mondoperaio", 1988, n. 8-9.

³¹ Cf. Lomellini, p. 231.

³² *Perestrojka. Amici e nemici*, 1988; *Pensare il mondo nuovo*, 1989.

³³ <http://www.fondazionestudistoricaturati.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Psi-Sezione-Dipartimento-internazionale.pdf>.

³⁴ L. Vasconi, *Gorbačëv: il despota (per ora) illuminato*, in "Mondoperaio", 1988, n. 10.

³⁵ Id., *Aiutare Gorbačëv?*, ivi, 1988, n. 8-9.

Gorbachev did not diminish, and the signs of crisis that clearly emerged at the beginning of 1989 were greeted almost with satisfaction³⁶.

On the contrary, Gorbachev's growing difficulties generated great concern in the PCI. However, the meeting that the delegation of the Italian Communist Party, led by the new Secretary Achille Occhetto (and also made up of Rubbi and Giuseppe Boffa), had in Moscow in February 1989 with the Soviet leader still took place in an atmosphere of trust in that which was the confrontation between two "new courses", that of the Italian party and that of the Soviet party. From the final communiqué emerged the profound harmony on the central axis of the political culture of the PCI, i.e. the relationship between democracy and socialism. Almost tracing the words spoken by Berlinguer in Moscow in 1977, the text stressed «the principle meaning of democracy, of the profound democratization of all processes, institutes and organizations, as the only realistic path of socialism. Democracy – it was concluded – is the main value»³⁷.

Introducing his collection of writings on Gorbachev and the European left that came out a few weeks later, Vacca defined «of great importance [...] the intense exchange of the Soviet “new way of thinking” with the Italian communist tradition», but also «with the development of European democratic socialism”. Communist movement, socialist countries and social democracies were all experiencing a phase of crisis, albeit with varying degrees of drama. In this context, perestroika constituted "a vital challenge to the whole left", urging it to "work out a new combination between national perspectives and internationalism". However, he added in the first essay of the book, the European left participated in a general "wait and see [...] towards the Gorbachev experiment", failing to take an adequate political initiative³⁸.

In the case of the Italian left, this appears to be confirmed by the facts. As far as the Communist Party is concerned, as Di Maggio observes, its rejection of any kind of "relaunch of collaboration between Communist parties based on Gorbachev's 'new way of thinking'" contributed to weaken it and "further reduce its impact"³⁹. As for the Socialist Party, it is difficult not to agree with Pons when he points out Craxi's "lack of incisiveness in the face of the change in international politics brought about by the advent of Gorbachev, despite his vision of an Italian Ostpolitik»⁴⁰. In both components of the Italian left, a short-sighted vision seemed to prevail, more concerned with their own destinies than with the success of an overall process that concerned the fate of the world left, as well as the international context as a whole. More recently, Vacca himself, returning to his reflection on these issues, wrote that «in the real “revolution” triggered by Gorbachev in international politics, the European left failed to play a role»⁴¹. The Italian left, which perhaps had a few more tools to intervene positively in that situation, was no exception, ending up contributing, albeit indirectly, to the defeat of Gorbachev's experiment.

³⁶ Id., *Se la grande crisi travolge Gorbačëv*, ivi, 1989, n. 3.

³⁷ Rubbi, pp. 229-254.

³⁸ *Gorbačëv e la sinistra europea*, pp. 11-12, 15.

³⁹ Di Maggio, p. 218.

⁴⁰ *Gli anni Ottanta come storia*, p. 225.

⁴¹ *La sfida di Gorbaciov. Guerra e pace nell'era globale*, with the collaboration of G. Fiocco, Salerno Editrice, 2019, p. 37.